lations for 153 countries over an eight-year period, and, using a cross sectional, time-series design, they examined the relative impact of sev eral independent variables, drawn largely from the extant literature. In turn, they reached a number of conclusions, for example, about the role of democracy in reducing human rights violations and about the role of international and domestic threats in exacerbating them.3 Their work represents an advance in terms of quantity of data analyzed, method ological sophistication, and the number of independent variables in cluded in the analysis.
For all that this is an advance, however, we do have reservations about this and related analyses in terms of their tendency to treat a multidimensional concept unidimensionally.4 In line with the develop ments in other areas of the discipline, we believe that theoretical and pol icy progress in the human rights area depends on recognizing the separate dimensions of the concept "repression of human rights to personal in tegrity."5 Indeed, recognizing the dimensions of concepts is a well-estab lished principle in the comparative methodology literature, and the theoretical and empirical maturation of research in other areas of the discipline has depended on this recognition. The argument of this re search note is a theoretical and methodological one that hinges on the problems of information loss and missed analytical opportunities arising from the failure to disaggregate the concept appropriately. In addition, in the second part of this research note, we illustrate these problems with some cross-national human rights data from the 1980s. We demonstrate both conceptually and empirically that unidimensional treatment of human rights confounds two important components of the concept? the use of imprisonment and the use of torture and killing?and gen erally produces a measure closer to the latter than to the former. Future research needs to recognize the detrimental normative and analytical consequences of a unidimensional treatment of the human rights con cept and should analyze its important components separately. ernization." Vallier described the procedure as "disaggregating a con cept or the exhausting of its analytical components."6 In a similar vein Robert Jackman revisited this same issue about a decade ago and put the concern more direcdy:
[ Variables are supposed to be unidimensional. While this may seem rudimen tary, the literature on comparative politics is replete with umbrella concepts that carry too much baggage to be reducible to a single unidimensional variable. Ex amples of such broad concepts include system support, political culture, mod ernization, democratic stability, mobilization, political institutionalization, and post-industrialism. Instead of identifying a potentially unidimensional variable, each of these concepts identifies a broad constellation of factors, which may or may not be empirically inter-related ... it is important to focus on their separate components if we are to make meaningful empirical statements about these problem areas.7
In our judgment, repression of human rights should be added to the list of master, or umbrella, concepts.
Before discussing the dimensions of this concept, let us focus more generally on the possible empirical and theoretical dividends of sepa rating out the components of a concept. Research on human rights views the individual as a subject of political control in her or his rela tionship to government. Consider, however, the individual in the role of citizen and politicalparticipant. A critical step in the analysis of indi vidual participation in the political process is the recognition that "po litical participation" as a concept is not unidimensional. To be sure, in early research, participation "was considered to be a unidimensional phenomenon. The main distinction across political actors was the ex tent of their activeness'?essentially how much effort they put into po litical participation."8 Yet Verba, Nie, and Kim also argued that the conceptualization must reflect, not only level of activity, but also type of activity. That is, political participation includes voting, campaign ac tivity, citizen-initiated contacting, and cooperative activity. They agued that "the failure to distinguish among types of participation is ... in large part responsible for many of the ambiguities in the findings about participation and its role in democracies?what causes it to increase or decrease, how it affects the allocation of social values, and so forth."9 Theoretically, the disaggregation of the concept led to the progressive realization that the different actions fit different structures of motiva tions, opportunities, and resources. In the case of participation, voting is a lower cost, "broad" benefit activity. In contrast, contacting is a higher cost, "narrow" benefit activity10
The development of the political participation concept, then, is highly suggestive for the concept of human rights violations, where in dividuals are the subjects of political control. However, the dominant approach in empirical work on human rights violations is to treat the concept unidimensionally. Advocating this approach, Poe and T?te say: "We believe that it can be persuasively argued that the two dimensions postulated by Mitchell and McCormick stem, in reality, from the one dimension that Stohl and his colleagues tap?that both torture/killing and imprisonment are rooted in a regime's willingness to repress its cit izens when they are considered a threat."11 One can have no great quar rel with the statement about the "roots" of repression?any more than Verba, Nie, and Kim would quarrel with a statement that participation is "rooted" in the citizen's willingness to influence his or her govern ment. Nevertheless, that view does not provide a persuasive rationale for aggregating data on imprisonment and torture/killing (or for that matter, data on voting, campaign activity, citizen contacting, and coop erative activity) in the same conceptual container. Instead, we contend that human rights violations differ in type not just amount, such that they cannot be clearly represented on a single scale.
That is, there is a substantive difference between the use of imprison ment on the one hand and the use of torture and killing on the other.12 Substantively, these are quite different types of government activity, with differing consequences for the victims, differing use of governmental re sources and capabilities, and differing costs for the government, both domestically and internationally. Normatively, too, there is a consider able distance between a regime that relies on imprisonment as a method of political control and one that relies on torture and killing.
This normative distinction provides a basis for arguments about the universal as opposed to culturally relative nature of human rights and even about the interpretation of international law concerning human rights. Bilahari Kausikan,an official in Singapore's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, argues that the "myth of the universality of all human rights is harmful if it masks the real gap that exists between Asian and Western perceptions of human rights,"13 and he asserts that future Western approaches on human rights will have to be formulated with greater nuance and precision. It makes a great deal of difference if the West in sists on humane standards of behavior by vigorously protesting genocide, mur der, torture, or slavery. Here there is a clear consensus on a core international law that does not admit derogation on any grounds. The West has a legitimate right and moral duty to promote those core human rights.... But if the West objects to, say, capital punishment, detention without trial, or curbs on press freedoms, it should recognize that it does so in a context where the international law is less definitive and more open to interpretation.14 Whether or not one agrees with this more restrictive definition of human rights, the important point here is that such discussion rein forces the argument that imprisonment and torture are qualitatively different activities. Regimes choose different mixes of these methods of political control, a variation that is masked by a one-dimensional scale. For governments or their agents considering violating human rights, the choice of one activity in addition to or over another will depend, in part, on their calculation of the costs and benefits. The costs refer not just to the deployment of their own resources but to the possibility of externally imposed costs, such as international sanctions. These costs will likely vary with the normative differences in the activities. The use of torture and killing carries the likelihood of higher external costs, and governments implicitly recognize this when they opt, for example, for "disappearing" victims rather than killing them. Furthermore, there may be different "benefits" attached to the use of torture or imprison ment. The agents themselves, police or soldiers, may derive more spe 14 Ibid., 39-40. 15 One analysis of the use of torture by police in India argues that because they have low status and low pay "as with many other Indian officials they feel driven to supplement their incomes. The de tainees themselves, or their families, are threatened with torture if they do not bribe the police?a threat that can work only if those who do not pay, or cannot pay, are in fact tortured." See David J. Rothman and Aryeh Neier, "India's Awful Prisons," New York Review of Books (May 16,1991), 54. If regimes see these practices as less or more acceptable, as argued by Kausikan, and frame their choices accordingly, then efforts to explain (and change) these practices will have to take these differences into ac count. Further, insofar as political scientists aim to generate knowledge that is useful to "governments, international organizations, and sub na tional actors . . . interested in improving respect for personal integrity around the world,"16 they will have to be sensitive to the different types of activity, the different meanings attached to them in different con texts, and the nature of the political challenge.
Composite Indices and Human Rights Violations
Beyond the normative and methodological arguments for separating umbrella concepts, like human rights violations, into their important components, there are conceptual and empirical arguments that center on measurement clarity, ease of interpretation, and loss of information.
Because we had collected and coded data for 1984 and 1987 from one of the same sources {Amnesty International Reports) that Poe and T?te used in their larger analysis and because they have generously provided their data, we can undertake several different kinds of tests to compare the two approaches for this same data source and across the same coun tries at the same time.
Let us first describe each coding scheme briefly. For their human rights measure, Poe and T?te used a composite index composed of a five-point ordinal scale, based on Freedom House's coding rules.17 A score of 1 was a country "under a secure rule of law, people are not im prisoned ..., and torture is rare or exceptional." By contrast, a score of 5 is a country where "the terrors of [level 4] have been expanded to the whole population." For our human rights measure, we developed two indices for each country, one based on the degree of arbitrary impris onment and the other based upon the systematic use of killings and torture of prisoners.18 Each index ranged from 0, where a country had no violations on that dimension, to 4, where a country had frequent vi olations.19
Although the Poe and T?te index was developed with a good level of intercoder reliability, there remain more fundamental problems in in terpreting its meaning. We can begin by examining the definitional 16PoeandTate(fn.2),867. construction of the index. Table 1 separates out the two major dimen sions that are mixed in Poe and T?te s composite measure and identi fies the key words in the coding rules that describe the level of activity on each dimension. Note first that for the imprisonment dimension the level of activity has to increase with each rank, whereas for the torture and killing dimension the level of activity is about the same for coun tries scoring a 1 or a 2, and quite possibly for countries scoring a 3 with the use of the conditional phrase ("may be common"). Only with coun tries ranked 4 or 5 could one be sure that torture and killing is greater than "rare." But at these ranks the distinctions concerning imprison ment ("more than extensive," and the "whole population") become more blurred. Further, as defined, the approach does not exhaust all the logical possibilities.20 Although the missing possibilities are quite rare, there is no ranking for instances where governments or their security forces have a "take no prisoners" strategy: that is, cases where impris onment rates are relatively low (less than extensive) but where torture and killing are widespread.21
In effect, the composite scale is more likely to capture the incidence of imprisonment better than the incidence of torture and killing at the lowest values of the scale; and it is more likely to capture the incidence of torture and killing better than the incidence of imprisonment at the highest values. As the two dimensions are not equally represented at each value on the composite scale, there is no reason to expect that they would be equally represented in any overall sense. By mixing the dimen sions in this way, we lose considerable information about the global con dition of human rights and can conceivably misconstrue the conditions within individual countries. Analytically, we lose the possibility of ex amining the choice strategies, the logic behind them, and the degree of complementarity between these separate methods of political control.
To this point the discussion has been definitional and conceptual, rather than empirical. Yet it is nevertheless interesting to examine how the logic of the composite scale manifests itself empirically, and how the separate dimensions are confounded in the composite scale. A sim 21 It is not simply genocidal regimes such as that in Nazi Germany or in Cambodia under Pol Pot that might aim for this combination of human rights violations. Take, for example, Amnesty Interna tional's description of human rights violations in the Philippines in its 1988 report. Descriptions focus almost entirely on extensive killings and disappearances, not on imprisonment of political dissidents. (.70 and .73 in 1984 and 1987, respectively) than imprisonment (.56 and .63).22 What these summary statistics can not help us with, however, is the question of the locus of the particular mixes of imprisonment and torture on the composite scale, and the modeling implications of mixing the measurements of imprisonment and torture decisions for a set of independent variables. It is to these is sues that we now turn.
First, is it the case, as our analysis of the composite scale's coding scheme suggests, that for these data imprisonment is "captured" better at the lower end of the composite scale than is torture? A simple cross tabular display is the most direct way to address this question. These expectations are generally borne out in Figure 1 . The top por tion of the figure shows quite vividly that the imprisonment scale is most closely associated with the composite scale at the two lowest val Yet a third way to assess the relative merits of the composite scales and the separate prisoner and torture scales would be to regress each on a common set of independent variables. If these dependent variables are capturing the same underlying process, we should expect to find sub stantial overlap in the number of significant variables with each of the different dependent variables. If we find differences between the com posite scale and the prisoner and torture scales and, in turn, between 25 We also ran a Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z test of normality for the dependent variable, the compos ite scale, for 1984 and 1987. In both instances, the scale was not normally distributed and thus some caution must accompany the interpretation of our regression results. Because we are working with a population of data and because we are employing a series of other tests, we believe that it is useful to report the regression results to obtain an overall portrait of the relationship among the three human rights scales.
26 As a further check on our analysis, we employed a discriminant analysis using the prisoner scale and the torture scale in separate runs as predictors of the placement of countries on the composite scale. In general, the results imply that both the prisoner and torture scales are more predictive of val ues at the high and low ends of the composite scale. While these results are not wholly consistent with our other analyses, they do suggest some distinctive emphases within the composite scale. On a cautionary note, this third test is based not only on the charac teristics of the different human rights scales but also on the quality of the set of independent variables already in the model. Thus, if the in dependent variables are weak or poorly specified or measured, we can not have much confidence in conclusions drawn from the differences or similarities across the various measures of the dependent variable.29
Furthermore, we should add that these results are not definitive on the role of these variables in accounting for human rights violations; rather, they are illustrative of the differing results one obtains for some previ ously used predictor variables when employing alternative measures of human rights violations. Finally, an additional complicating factor, of course, is that we are employing ordinary least squares regression for this test with dependent variables that are ordinal, not interval.
The coefficients for these regression analyses with the differing de pendent variables are reported in Table 3 . In their pooled analysis, Poe and T?te find four of their ten variables significantly related to their composite measure: civil war, international war, democracy, and popu lation size. There is little overlap in the variables that are significant with the composite scale and the separate prison and torture indices. Across the six equations, only the civil war variable appears important in affecting violations of human rights, regardless of the dependent variable chosen (excepting the prison index, 1987). Besides civil war, the only other variable that produces any consistency across the mea sures is the logged population variable, a measure simply connoting that the size of a country affects the magnitude of human rights viola tions. (Because Amnesty International's reporting procedure does not take into account the population size of countries, analysts must control 28 On this point, see Poe and T?te (fn. 2), 856-57. 29 Poe and T?te operationalize their influential civil war variable in terms of number of deaths, the government "involved as a direct participant in the war," and the assumption that "there must be ef fective resistance" on the nongovernment side. This may provide them a distinction between genocide and civil war, as they assert, but it does not permit the confident assertion that civil war as a "concept is kept distinct from our dependent variable"; Poe and T?te (fn. 2), 859. There is likely considerable circularity between the measurement of civil war and the measure of government "repression of human rights to personal integrity," particularly at the high end (values 4 and 5 of the dependent variable). Thus, the interpretation of the relationship between the civil war variable and the dependent variable should be treated carefully.
Finally, we should note that while Table 4 reports a significant relationship for leftist government control and the unidimensional measure of human rights violations for 1984, the coefficient has the wrong sign, as it had in Poe and Tares pooled analysis; Poe and T?te (fn. 2), 861. The results seem to suggest a substantial difference between the pre dictor variables and the Poe and T?te dependent measure and Mitchell and McCormick measures (taken as a group), but are the predictors sufficiendy different for the separate indices to warrant the use of the prisoner/torture distinction? Here the results provide some support for our contention that imprisonment and killing are distinct strategies that produce some scattered contrasts in significance and direction of the relationships. Focusing on the war variables, civil war is generally significant for the imprisonment and torture scales, but some differ ences between the imprisonment and torture and killing scales emerge for international war. For three of the independent variables (LEFT, MILCTR2, and POPINC), the direction of the relationship changes for the differing dependent measures. For the other variables, there are differ ences in the size of the coefficients across the different measures of the dependent variables, and some prove statistically significant.30 30 We computed t-tests for the differences between the unstandardized coefficients (assuming inde pendence) for each model with the other two (that is, the composite model with the prison model, the composite model with the torture model, and the prison model with the torture model) for each year. For the 1984 data, three differences were significant: the coefficients for the LEFT variable for the com posite and prison measures were significantly different from one another at the .05 level, the coeffi cients for the LPOP variable with the composite and torture measures were significantly different at the .10 level, and the coefficients for the LEFT variable with the prison and torture models were signifi candy different at the .10 level. For the 1987 data, three were significant as well: the coefficients for the CWAR variable for the composite and prison models (.01), the coefficients for the LPOP variable for the composite and torture models (.01), and the coefficients for the LEFT variable for the prison and tor ture models (.10).
Finally, we should note that the comparison of the performance of the dependent variables is only as strong as the theoretical justification and operationalization of the independent variables.31 But even this last and most contingent empirical analysis provides some support for the direct comparisons of the dependent variables, suggesting that the con tent of human rights violations and the different approaches to mea suring this content have important implications for social science modeling as well as for victims.
Conclusions
Human rights violations is an important but complicated concept, and we recognize that we are dealing with only a portion of it in this analy sis. In international law, for example, human rights extends to eco nomic and social rights, while also including the "integrity of the 31 See Carmines and Zeller (fn. 30), 26. Also, as Poe and T?te (fn. 2) point out, "The development of theories to explain ... such crimes ... would seem to be a vital undertaking, [yet] social science scholars have only begun to use the newly developed information toward this end" (p. 853). Unfortu nately, assessing the construct validity of a concept uis, by necessity theory-laden. ... In a very real sense, whenever one assesses the construct validity of the measure of interest, one is also evaluating si multaneously the construct validity of measures of the other theoretical concepts"; Carmines and Zeller (fn. 30), 23-25. onment versus the use of torture and killing). The conceptual problem is the failure to appreciate fiilly the value of disaggregation, an established principle of social science methodology and a design decision critical to the development of social science methodology.
The various empirical analyses presented here support the method ological and theoretical arguments for disaggregation. In practice, the unidimensional scale, while designed to represent both the major di mensions of human rights violations, does so in a way that is difficult to interpret. Both imprisonment and torture are methods of political con trol that are important in themselves, and research efforts ought to be geared to maximizing information gains about both of these activities. Using separate indices seems a more appropriate means for moving in that direction.
The work of social scientists in a related area also makes a com pelling and persuasive case for disaggregation. Those interested in gen erating useful knowledge on individual crimes, rather than state crimes, do not employ a one-dimensional crime scale that combines nonviolent and violent crimes. They disaggregate shoplifting from rape and seek explanations for these substantively different types of criminal activity.
To draw out the parallel, one would think that disaggregating state crimes would be a rudimentary and a relatively uncontroversial research design decision as well. Indeed, only when we have done the job of "ex hausting [human rights violations] of [their] analytical components"32
can we be confident of making the most of our analytic opportunities. Finally, and importantly, as analysts have increasingly moved toward understanding human rights violations as a policy choice?that gov ernments have alternatives in how much and what type of human rights to violate?then disaggregating the types of violations into their key components has become even more important. In this sense, the prospects for theoretical breakthrough seem greater through disaggre gation than through reliance on a composite scale that masks impor tant underlying components of the human rights concept.
